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Policy has encouraged ‘mixed tenure’ neighbourhoods in many countries for several decades, but there is little evidence on how much tenure mix has existed at any point, partly due to the lack of agreement on definitions or measures. Here 11 measures are developed and applied. The proportion of ‘mixed tenure’ neighbourhoods in England in 2001 varied from 9% - neighbourhoods not dominated by one tenure -  to 100% - at least some diversity. Indices of segregation showed that in 2001 owner occupiers were the most isolated group, and the more dissimilar from and least exposed to other tenures. 1981-2001 mix increased in terms of neighbourhoods with social renting under threshold levels, the index of dissimilarity for owner occupiers and social renters, and the index of exposure for all major tenure groups, but declined according to other measures. Trends are mainly to changes in the overall tenure system rather than to mixed tenure neighbourhood policy.






Mixed (or more mixed) housing tenure within residential neighbourhoods has been pursued trough housing and urban policy in countries including the UK, France, The Netherlands, Australia, Ireland, and the US (Osterdorf et al. 2001, Van Kempen et al. 2005), and for many decades (Cole and Goodchild 2001). Mixed tenure has been as a policy goal in itself, a tool to achieve social mix, and as a proxy indicator of social mix. It became increasingly salient in policy in many countries, including the UK, from the 1980s (eg [80s?] Urban Task Force 1999, SEU 2001, ODPM 2003, DCLG 2007, Galster 2007, Lupton et al. 2009, Bond et al. 2011). In the UK, policies partly aiming to promote mixed tenure have included social housing estate redevelopment, via Estate Action and other ABIs, mixed tenure in new developments via local plans and s106 planning agreements, by buying and building social housing in areas of home ownership, and by inserting home ownership into social renting areas via the Right to Buy and other low-cost home ownership schemes. 

There has been much discussion and research on whether housing tenure mix is of independent value (eg. Bond et al. 2011), how effective tenure mix is as a tool to achieve social mix, and on the impact of housing and renewal policies intended to encourage greater tenure mix (Lupton et al. 2009). There have even been reviews of reviews of such research (Bond et al. 2011). However, two fundamental conceptual and empirical gaps remain after decades of tenure mix policy and research. We do not have an agreed or even several acceptable and operationalisaeble definitions of a ‘mixed tenure neighbourhood or of tenure mix across a series of neighbourhoods. In consequence, we do know how many mixed tenure neighbourhoods there are, or much tenure mix there is overall. Thus we cannot describe how ‘mixed’ any case study areas are in absolute terms or relative to the overall set of neighbourhoods; we cannot say whether policies to encourage more tenure mix have had any net effect, given other contextual changes in the tenure system and how neighbourhoods are structured, and we cannot say what level or aspects of ‘mix’ might be associated with different outcomes for the residents who experience it (eg Graham et al. 2009, Bond et al. 2011). 

This paper identified or develops and then applies nine definitions of tenure mix, some based on commonplace understandings of ‘mix’, some derived from the rich body of research on mixed tenure, some from mixed tenure policy, and others widely used in the study of inequality and of ethnic segregation. These measures are applied to neighbourhood level housing tenure data from the 1981 and 2001 censuses of population in England. Then the paper answers the following fundamental questions:
1) How many ‘mixed tenure’ neighbourhoods were there in England in 2001 or how mixed was tenure at neighbourhood level across the country? 
2)	How has this changed 1981-2001? 
3)	What are the implications for past and future tenure mix policy?
Numerous articles have explored whether tenure mix, however defined, has an effect on outcomes for the people who experience it, and thus whether tenure mix policy is effective in terms of the achievability of these ultimate goals (??Bond et al. 2011). Instead, this paper is concerned with the more limited – but essential – question of whether tm policy is effective in terms of actually influencing the number of mixed tenure areas, and how mixed tenure is nationwide.


Definitions of tenure mix

Tunstall noted “there has been very little discussion of how mixed tenure can be identified and measured” (2000 p7). Docherty et al noted, “few studies or indeed development plans for mixed tenure housing define an ‘ideal’ level of mixing, preferring to take a pragmatic approach” (?? P21). Given the volume of wiring and research on mixed tenure, this omission seems demand explanation. In policy and practice, there may be a sense that encouraging ‘more mix’ than currently exists or would typically occur in a new development is sufficient, at least as an interim policy goal. For example, the UK government’s Communities Plan: called for “well integrated mix of… homes of various types and tenures” (2003 p??), and later policy encouraged “sufficient range, diversity, affordability and accessibility within a balanced housing market” (DCLG 2006 p). Even in estate redevelopment projects where achieving greater tenure and social mix was a key aim, such as in the 12 Mixed Communities Demonstration Projects which operated 2005-2010??, there were not always explicit targets for final tenure mix (Burgess et al. 2009). The majority of research studies of ‘mixed tenure’ have proceeded without firm a priori definitions of mixed tenure. Most have tended to assert by implication that case studies used are ‘mixed’, or at least ‘more mixed’ than other neighbourhoods, past situation in the case of redevelopment or other new neighbourhoods in the aces of new build areas. Many studies do not describe case study areas tenure mix in much detail, which means it is difficult to compare between studies or to lean about what level or type of mix might be most associated with differences in outcomes (Docherty et al.?? Graham et al. 2009, Bond et al. 2011). In research too, there may be a reluctance to specify definitions based on cut-off points which might be arbitrary, or appear so at least in the absence of convincing evidence, and in policy there may be a reluctance to provide hostages to fortune which might either appear too ambitious or which might be too inflexibly implemented. However, numerous authors have considered the issues and concepts which a definition and measure of mixed tenure should cover. 

Firstly, how are the range of household situations to be divided up into tenure categories and which ‘tenures’ are we interested in? Mixed tenure research and policy sometimes distinguish ‘social renting’ from all other tenures or from ‘private’ tenures (eg Silverman et al. 2005). Sometimes it distinguishes home ownership from all rented tenures. Planning policy distinguishes ‘affordable’ housing from non-shared ownership and private renting. Private rented tenure may be ignored altogether, and differences for example within social housing or home ownership are usually overlooked. Docherty et al. noted that tenure mix research and policy has generally been interested in just how ownership and social renting, or sometimes local authority renting, and sometimes in the mix between them and sometimes just the proportion of households made up by social renting. Graham et al. said that, in practice, mixed tenure policies are concerned “exclusively with the mix between social renting and owner occupation” (2009 p145). It has been suggested that mixed tenure policy might be a misnomer or a euphemism for a social housing policy, a policy which aimed to limit, minimise or remove this tenure (Tunstall 2003). 

Once tenure categories of interest have been established, the absolute or relative proportions or combinations that count as mixed or unmixed need to be defined. Graham et al. noted, “clearly, areas that are 100% monotenure would be excluded, while areas with a 50:50 split [between two tenures] are clearly mixed, but how far either side of a 50/50 split do we extend the range?” (2009 p145). Even the 50:50 split is only intuitively - and only arguably – ‘mixed’: an area with a 50:50 social/private housing or renting: owning split as ‘mixed’ would have much more social or rented housing than the national or ward averages.
Secondly, what size and type of areas are definitions going to be applied to? Areas used in definitions and research on mixed tenure have included electoral wards, enumeration districts or Middle and Lower Output areas, and ‘estates’. Numerous writers have made the point that neighbourhoods as social realities are unlikely to match these administrative boundaries, and may be different – and possibly widely varying – in size. Many theories of mixed tenure suggest that effects depend on observation or interaction, and most state or imply that this may occur at a smaller neighbourhood than an MSOA or ward, which have several thousand households, and closer to an enumeration district or output area (see Table 1). The concern in policy to achieve ‘pepperpotting’, that is tenure diversity in a single street or block and between literal neighbours is based n the idea that it is mainly or only mix within areas possibly even smaller still that is important (advocacy of pepperpotting egs). Some evidence suggests the size of area across which mix is meaningful varies between types of residents or outcomes (??). On the other hand, in France and some Australian states, policy, partly concerned with the overall supply of homes in different tenures as well as tenure mix and neighbourhood level, has been concerned with the tenure mix in the local authority area (Wood 2003). The smaller an area and the greater the number of units under consideration, the greater potential for diversity and deviation from national means. 
A number of authors have developed definitions of mixed tenure which could be used to count mixed areas, assess nationwide mix and to assess tenures, and a few have applied them. These are discussed more below. This paper developers nine different definitions of ‘mixed tenure’, drawing on examples or comments in the mixed tenure literature. These definitions fall into two types. 


Data to which definitions will be applied





Table 1: Potential tenure categories available from census data, England, 1981, 2001

	1981	2001	% change in numbers of households 1981-2001






‘Market’ or ‘private housing’ (owner occupation including shared ownership and private renting)1	11,486,407	70.0%	1,6510,697	80.7%	43.7%
Rented housing (social renting and private renting)2	7,019,530	42.2%	6,397,311	31.3%	-8.9%
‘Affordable’ housing (social renting and shared ownership)3	NA	NA	4,074,425	19.9%	NA
All households	16,649,995	100.0%	20,451,431	100.0%	 22.8%
Note 1: In 2001, this includes the 3.2% of households living ‘rent free’; 2: This includes the 0.7% of households in shared ownership and the 3.2% of households living ‘rent free’; arguably both could or should be excluded from the category [or ‘other, check??]; 3: In 2001 this excludes other forms of low-cost home ownership which the census doesn’t allow to be reported.

The groupings are pragmatic: three major tenure groups, which appear regularly in mixed tenure research and policy, and some additional combined categories. Census involves self-categorisation by the householder who fill in the form. There may be errors or unconventional conceptions of tenure on the part of residents. Some households who in 2001, after stock transfer, were legally housing association tenants, may have responded that they were still local authority tenants, and census and survey data have become unrealiable on this factual matter. The ‘living rent free’ category may be used by people living n homes ultimately owned by private individuals or by social landlords or private companies. In addition, small numbers in small area data [how small] contains some randomly altered numbers in order to protect individual confidentiality. The data excludes those living outside private households.

The definitions are applied to neighbourhoods of two sizes for 2001: Median Super Output Areas (MSOAs) and Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs). The median MSOA had 2,966 households and 7,113 people, and MSOAs are, as discussed, probably larger than the ‘neighbourhoods’ implied in most mixed tenure research. The median LSOA had 623 households and 1,485 people (Table 2).
 
The definitions are also applied to the nearest readily available comparison area to MSOAs for 1981, electoral wards. The two sets of ‘neighbourhoods’ are not directly and unproblematic ally comparable. They have different boundaries. The median 1981 ward had 2,098 households and 4584 people in 1981, and so was slightly smaller than the median 2001 MSOA, and in addition, the size of the 1981 units was much more variable (Table1). In 2001 all MSOAs had at least 500 households. Very small wards with fewer than 500 households with resident members are excluded from 1981 analysis, in order to avoid very small neighbourhoods affecting neighbourhood counts disproportionately. Nevertheless, there are some implications for comparison 1981-2001. Evidence is reported both in terms of the number and percentage of neighbourhoods and the number and percentage of households, to make clear the impact of variation in sizes of neighbourhoods and variation in this variation 1981-2001. 

Data for 1981 were accessed for 1981 via the ‘Linking censures through time’ website www.lct.org.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.lct.org.uk​). 2001 data come from Key Statistics Table 18 Tenure, and were assessed and for 2001 via www.casweb.mimas.ac.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.casweb.mimas.ac.uk​). Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO.


The first type of definition and results









1. Bare minimum: Neighbourhoods with at least one household from each of two tenures
Number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods	7,807	6,782	32,482	NA
% neighbourhoods mixed	100%	100%	100%	0
% households in mixed neighbourhoods	100%	100%	100%	0
2. No overall majority: Neighbourhoods not dominated by any one tenure
Number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods	804 	613	2,935	NA
% neighbourhoods mixed	10.2%	9.0%	9.0%	-1.2%
% households in mixed neighbourhoods	11.3%	9.5%	9.5%	-1.8%
3. Neighbourhoods not dominated by social renting
Number of neighbourhoods not dominated by social renting	6,621	6439	29,449	
% of all neighbourhoods	84.8%	94.6%	90.7%	+10.2%
% all households	79.8%	94.7%	90.4%	+14.9%
One-tenure dominated neighbourhoods
Number of neighbourhoods dominated by owner occupiers	5,755	5,800	26,299	
% of all neighbourhoods	73.7%	85.5%	80.9%	+11.8%
% all households	67.6%	84.9%	80.1%	+17.3%
Number of neighbourhoods dominated by social renting	1,186	343	3,033	
% of all neighbourhoods	15.2%	5.1%	9.3%	-10.1%
% all households	20.2%	5.3%	9.6%	-8.4%
Number of neighbourhoods dominated by private renting	65	16	213	
% of all neighbourhoods	0.8%	0.5%	0.7%	-0.3%
% of all households	0.7%	0.2%	0.1%	-0.5%
4. Hiscock’s definition: Not dominated by social renting and not heavily dominated by owner occupation. Social renting under 50% and owner occupation 30-70%
Number of neighbourhoods	3,771	2,550	10,906	
Percentage of neighbourhoods	48.3%	37.6%	33.6%	-10.7%
Percentage of households in such neighbourhoods	46.2%	38.6%	35.4%	-7.6%
5. Avoiding extremes: No one tenure was more than one standard deviation from the national median
Number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods	4,238	3,958	17,979	
% of all neighbourhoods	54.3%	58.4%	55.4%	+4.1%
% of all households	51.3%	57.7%	54.6%	+6.4%
6. Limited social housing (under 20%)
Number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods	3,536	4,287	21,023	
% of all neighbourhoods	45.3%	63.2%	64.7%	+17.9%
% all households	38.8%	64.2%	64.1%	+25.4%
7. Some, limited affordable1 housing (20-30%)
Number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods	1,593	1,051	3,768	
% of all neighbourhoods	20.4%	15.5%	11.6%	-4.9%
% all households	18.7%	15.3%	11.7%	-3.4%
Note 1: For 1981, local authority, new town and ‘other’ social renting; and for 2001 local authority renting housing association renting and shared ownership; 2: Excludes wards with fewer than 500 households.

1. Bare minimum. A mixed tenure neighbourhoods is one in which is not literally a mono-tenure area and where there is at least one household of at least two tenures. 

This definition contrasts literal monotenure areas with others that have at least minimal diversity. ‘Monotenure’ areas have been widely problematised (Tunstall 2003??). Private developers have used the term ‘mixed tenure’ to contrast to a standard 100% home ownership developments, and to refer to developments which have at least a literal minimal mix of tenures. In a speech on mixed tenure in 2006 Housing Minister Yvette Cooper argued that owner occupation monotenure might be a suitable target for policy. In practice, the term ‘monotenure’ is used almost without expectpon with the spoken or unspoken suffix ‘social housing’ or ‘estates’, and these are the neighbourhoods that are the subject of concern and policy activity (eg Graham et al. 2009).

The absence of literal monotenure is an extremely inclusive definition of ‘mix’. The very first Right to Buy application or the decision of an owner occupier to rent out their home will change a large estate from monotenure to ‘mixed’. Clearly, the larger the neighbourhood under consideration the more unlikely to is that it will be literally monotenure, for any overall national mix. The majority of English social housing was built in literal monotenure developments, usually called ‘estates’, but these often contained fewer than 500 homes and so were smaller than many areas defined as ‘neighbourhoods’, and many proxies used to defined them, such as wards or MSOAs. Thus the wider ‘neighbourhoods’ in which these estates were built would not have been ‘monotenure’, even immediately after completion and before the Right to Buy. Numerous theories about benefits of mixed tenure rely on observation or interaction between those in different tenures (eg. Galster 2007). This definition is not appropriate for such theories, as they would require both a minimum number or proportion of the advantaged (owner occupier) tenure to carry the burden of observation and interaction. 

Results: 100% of both larger and smaller neighbourhoods were mixed tenure. (Table 3). In 2001, every single English MSOA and LSOA was mixed in the sense that all had at least one household from each of two tenures. 

The MSOA closest to being ‘unmixed’ by this definition was Blyth Valley 006, Northumberland, which had just 47 households which were not owner occupiers: 18 social renters and 28 private renters. Just five MSOAs, all located in an area where the local authority had by 2001 transferred all of its housing stock to a housing association (ref), lacked and local authority renting households. This figure has to be a very substantial undercount, due to misreporting of their legal tenure by residents. In 2001 over a hundred local authorities in England had completed stock transfer of homes to housing associations, and apart from areas where other local authorities owned out of borough homes, all neighbourhoods in these local authorities should have no local authority renting households. Nine lacked any ‘other’ social renting households. 93 neighbourhoods lacked any shared owners. The LSOA that was closest to being ‘unmixed’ was Brentwood 001B which had 492 owner occupiers and 2 households living ‘rent free’.


2. Not dominated by any one major tenure: A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one where no one major tenure has more than 50% of households. 

This definition takes a greatly modified approach, to contrast neighbourhoods which are not literally monotenure in term of definition 1, but which are ‘dominated’ in a mathematical sense by one tenure, with those which are not dominated. The 50% cut-off does not appear to relate to any evidence about how neighbourhoods operate. The definition has not been used explicitly in mixed tenure policy, and although perhaps ne of the more intuitive definitions It has been used in some research on tenure mix. Harvey et al. 1997 applied thresholds for social housing at 50% to census enumeration districts to identify social housing ‘estates’ in 1991 (1997), although they did not exploit define all other areas as ‘mixed’. Following this, Tunstall suggested distinguishing ‘mixed tenure systems’, with no one of three main tenures was over 50%, from ‘dominated systems’ with one tenure between 50-70%, and ‘heavily dominated tenure systems’ with one tenure over 70% of all households, and applied these definitions to secondary data on nations, regions and las (2000). These measures were developed by Hiscock (2002) (se below). Again, much discussion of and research on mixed tenure is focussed on a sub-group of areas unmixed by this definition, neighbourhoods dominated by social renting (eg Harvey et al. 1997, Tunstall et al. 2011). The English House Condition survey has distinguished between ‘primarily council-built’ and ‘predominantly privately built’ neighbourhoods, as judged by visited surveyors (ODPM 2003). 

Graham et al. noted that given the national tenure mix, in contrast to definition 1, this definition will be a very narrow view of mix (2009). As the proportion of English households in home ownership reached 50% in the early 1980s, most neighbourhoods are likely to be dominated by home ownership.. 

Results: 9.0% of both larger and smaller neighbourhoods were mixed tenure. (Table 3). The vast majority were dominated by one tenure. In the majority of ‘unmixed’ cases, the dominant tenure was owner occupation. 85.5% of larger neighbourhoods and 80.9% of smaller neighbourhoods were dominated by owner occupier. 


3. Not dominated by social housing: A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one in which social renters make up 50% or fewer households. 

This is one pragmatic, non-literal way of defining ‘monotenure’ social housing areas.

Results: 94.9% of larger neighbourhoods and 90.7% of smaller noods were mixed tenure. (Table 3). In most cases, there is little difference between the percentage of neighbourhoods in a category and the percentage of households (Figure 3). This definition has the largest difference bin results for numbers of neighbourhoods and for numbers of households, at which implies that social-housing dominated MSOAs tend to have fewer households than other neighbourhoods.


4. Hiscock’s definition: A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one which is not dominated by social renting and not heavily dominated by owner occupation. This is one type of definition in which two or more major tenures falls between certain fixed limits. 

Hiscock developed a more complicated and specific version of (2) (2002), later applied by Kearns and Mason 2007. Hiscock described neighbourhoods ‘dominated’ by one tenure, with a 50% threshold, and ‘heavily dominated’ by one tenure, with a 70% threshold. In contrast, she identified three types of ‘mixed’ neighbourhoods: i) more owned than rented, ii) owned and social rented, and iii) owned and private rented (2002 in Kearns and Mason 2007). In each case owner occupation had to be in the range 30-70%, and social renting had to be under 50%; Hiscock placed no limit on private renting. These thresholds have been selected without great explanation, but do relate to the contemporary national distribution of tenures, with home ownership at approximately 70% of all households. This reflects the fairly wide stated but vague goal of a more ‘normal’ tenure mix. This measure of mix will not be appropriate for evaluating policy that is not concerned by concentrations or distribution of home ownership and private renting really focussed on the local concentration of social housing.

Results: 37.6% larger neighbourhoods and 33.6%, slightly fewer, small neighbourhoods were mixed tenure. (Fig 3).


5. Avoiding extremes: A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one in which each major tenure falls within a relative limit. In this case each major tenure group is within one standard deviation of the median neighbourhood level for that tenure.

This definition develops definition 4 to describe ‘mix’ relative to the overall tenure structure of the time and place under consideration, as opposed to a fixed threshold set independently of context. This index is independent of the overall relative size of the tenure groups, and thus can be used to measure changes in segregation over time. This definition is more technical than any that has been used in policy or research, but like definition 4, reflects the fairly wide stated but vague goal of a more ‘normal’ tenure mix. 

Results: 58% of larger and 55.4% of smaller neighbourhoods were mixed tenure (Table 3). Under this definition of ‘unmixed areas’, no one tenure stood out as the main overrepresented one. All these ‘mixed tenure’ neighbourhoods were dominated by owner occupation, as the range for home ownership defined by one standard deviation was 58.9-86.9% of all households, and so all would fail Definition 2.


6. Limited social housing. A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one which has less than 20% social housing. This is one form of defintion in which one or more major tenures fall below or above fixed threshold. The threshold can be chosen purposively on the basic of putative or proven non-linear effects around this threshold. 

This definition is appropriate for many theories of mixed tenure which relay on observation and interaction, as may require a maximum number or proportion of the disadvantaged (social rented or renter) tenure to feel the full effects of observation and interaction with the more advantaged group. The idea that there may be thresholds at certain level of poverty or minority ethnicity in a neighbourhoods at which neighbour effects appear or accelerate have been explored substantially in the United States. For example, Jargowsky defined ‘concetrated poverty’ tracts as those with 20% of residents poor (??). Recent research has confirmed that there a threshold effect at 15-20% poor households (residents) in a census tract, and area of approximately people (Galster, 2002, 2007). However, it is known that thresholds vary for different residents and outcomes, as Galster found in a review of evidence on social mix (2007), and may do for different sizes of area or minim populations, and thresholds may vary in size.

There has been relatively little similar research in the UK. One study of levels of social renting at ward level found a relationship between ward level social renting and outcomes in terms of unemployment, long term illness, and standardised and premature mortality, after controls (Docherty et al. ??). It was generally a linear relationship, so that higher proportions of social housing were associated with worse outcomes across the population, but there was no sign of distinct threshold. Wards with 10-19% social housing showed a significant advantage in terms of overall outcomes after controls in relation to levels of employment, standardised limiting illness and premature death and standardised mortality, and wards with 20-29% social housing also showed significant advantage in relation to the first three variables (Docherty et al. ?? p12). There was little difference between wards with 30-39%, 40-49, 50-59%. 60-69% ad 69%+ social housing , and, perhaps oddly, those with 0-9% social housing, and all showed significant disadvantages. Two other studies have suggested there may be threshold effects at neighbourhood?? Level at the point where social housing makes up 20% of households and other tenures 80% of households, in term sof reports of neighbourhood problems and desire for neighbourhood improvements (Kearns and Mason 2007) and for employment statistics (Van Ham and Manley 2009). 

Results: 63.2% of larger and 64.7% of smaller neighbourhoods neighbourhoods were mixed tenure (Table 3). These included some neighbourhoods dominated by owner occupation or private renting (which would fail Definition 1), and some neighbourhoods where not all three tenures were within one standard deviation of the median (some where social housing was below 2.1% of the total, and some with more or less owner occupation and private renting than one standard deviation from the norm) (which would fail Definition 2). 


7. Some, limited affordable housing. A mixed tenure neighbourhood is one which has 20-30% affordable housing. This is another type of definition in which one or more major tenures fall below or above fixed threshold. In this case the threshold is, chosen purposively on the basis of planning policy for new housing development in England.

As with the previous definition, this one is based on a threshold, but in this case it is solely policy-related. Several countries or parts of countries have set minima, this time, which social rented homes are to make up either the overall totals or of homes in new development. For example, since 1990, in France all municipalities (not neighbourhoods) have been required to have at least 20% social housing, although many have not complied. In some US states ‘inclusionary zoning’ requires a certain proportion of new homes to be for rental or for low cost rental. In England, since 1990 local authority planners have been permitted to negotiate agreements for planning gain, and they have increasingly required private developers to provide homes or land for affordable homes within their larger developments (ref). Similarly in Ireland from 2000 20% of new homes were to be social or ‘affordable’ (Norris 2004). Practice varies, but English planners’ expectation have gradually become formalised and have tended to require 25% affordable housing on larger development sites, usually those with more than 25 homes. By 2007, “the most common target was 30-40% affordable housing” (Burgess et al. 2007 p35). In practice, developments sometimes fell below this ratio or some affordable housing is provided off site: “what is actually delivered in practice is often far less [than 30-40%]” (Burgess et al. 2007 p35, also (Silverman et al. 2005, Rowlands et al. 2006). For example, three varying cases had 25% affordable housing in 2007 (Burgess et al. 2008). Thus areas with 20-30% affordable housing could be described as mixed tenure in the terms of s106 policy at 2001. 

Results: 15.5% of larger neighbourhoods and 11.6% of smaller neighbourhoods were mixed tenure. (Table 3). There were 1,051 MSOAs where the proportion of affordable homes (including social renting and shared ownership) was at least 20% and under 30% of all households. These ‘mixed tenure’ neighbourhoods included some neighbourhoods dominated by owner occupation or private renting (which would fail Definition 2), and some neighbourhoods where not all three tenures were within one standard deviation of the median (some with more or less owner occupation and private renting than one standard deviation from the norm) (which would fail Definition 2).





Second type of definition and results

The second type of definition does not categorise individual neighbourhoods, but instead can be applied across nations, regions or cities to characterise them as having more or less mix across neighbourhoods, and if a threshold is applied, can be used to categorise nations, regions or cities as ‘mixed’ or ‘unmixed’. However, the second type cannot be applied to individual neighbourhoods. These are indices of segregation, widely applied in the studied of differences in residential patterns of different ethnic groups (eg Massey and Denton 2003, Finney and Simpson??), but also for other variables across space. For example, Dorling and Rees applied these across space for all 26 key statistics for Census 2001 (2003), and they have also been used to assess gender and ethnic segregation between employment organisations rather than across space. There are several indices of segregation. Three main ones are used here, the index of dissimilarity, of isolation, and exposure. All three allow us to understand how two groups of people or households, ys and zs, are spread across places of smaller spatial scale, such as neighbourhoods, within larger spatial areas, such as local authorities, regions or a nation. All may be affected by the modifiable area unit problem, which means is may be difficult to compare segregation over time if the size and number of spatial sub-units such as local authority and ward boundaries have changed. Some may be affected by the changing relative size of the categories being examined, which mean in may be difficulty to compare segregation over time because tenures have changed in size. Unlike the first type, these definitions do not make the remaining task for mixed tenure policy clear. Policy might aim to avoid all segregation and to reduce all scores to zero. However, in Ireland the Planning and Development Act 2000 required local authorities more modestly to ‘avoid undue segregation’ (Norris 2004, emphasis added). Results are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.


8. The index of isolation. The isolation index measures how unevenly one group is distributed between smaller areas across the larger area. It does not compare two groups. 

The isolation index for ys is:
The sum of the calculation of the following formula for every smaller area which makes up the larger area:
(ys1/YL) x (zs1 /ts1).
Described in words, where we are considering, for example, the isolation of council renters at neighbourhood level in England. this formula refers to the sum of the calculation for every neighbourhood in England of the following: council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of council renters nationwide multiplied by council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of all households in the neighbourhood. The isolation index for ys will be different to that for zs. The isolation index is a number between 0 and 100. It will be of interest for concerns about any one group and their degree of isolation from all other groups and sub-areas, as is the case with different housing tenures, where some theories abbot possible effect of tenure mixing rely on social interaction. However, the index of exposure/interaction (below), looks at this more directly. 
Results: In 2001, for larger neighbourhoods, private renters were the least isolated major tenure group, with an index of 17.1 followed by social renters at 31.2, and owner occupiers were the most isolated tenure group with an index of 73.1. Smaller neighbourhoods showed the same pattern, with slightly higher isolation for all groups. (Table 4). Looking at tenure sub-groups, in larger neighbourhoods ha renters at 12.6 were slightly less isolated than private renters, and local authority renters at 26.4. Outright owners were slightly les isolated at 32.9 than those buying with a mortgage at 41.6. The small number of shared owners were the least isolated of all subgroups. In general, the smallest groups were least isolated and the largest groups were more isolated. In effect, this index descries the remaining task for an even-spread tenure policy focussed on one tenure alone, which seeks to replicate the national tenure proportion within every neighbourhood.















Buying with a mortgage	NA	41.6	43.3	NA
All private tenures	74.6	83.5	85.2	+8.9
9. Dissimilarity of main tenure categories from all other groups
Private renting from all other tenures (and visa versa)	14.7	26.8	42.1	+12.1
Owner occupation from all other tenures (and visa versa)	35.1	32.1	40.2	-3.0
Social rented from all other tenures (and visa versa)	41.8	38.9	49.3	-2.9
Dissimilarity from particular groups
Owner occupation from private renting (and visa versa)	33.6	30.4	46.8	-3.2
Shared ownership1 from other home ownership (and visa versa)	NA	35.6	48.0	NA
Social renting from private renting (and visa versa)	46.6	38.2	46.9	-8.4
Social rented from owner occupation (and visa versa)	43.0	40.3	51.1	-2.7
Local authority renting from housing association renting (and visa versa)	55.5	49.4	59.7	-6.1
Note 1: Excludes wards with fewer than 500 households; 2: Includes shared ownership but excludes other forms of low-cost home ownership.


9. The index of dissimilarity. This aims to measure the evenness with which two population subgroups are spread between spatial sub areas of a larger unit. 

This index will be of particular interest to those concerned with access to spatial resources, such as labour markets or school, and differences in access between groups. (Those who are most concerned with potential interaction between groups will focus on the next index, below). If the mix in each sub-area is exactly the same as the overall mix, the index would be zero. Colloquially, it describes the proportion of the overall population who would need to move across sub-unit boundaries in order to produce a completely even distribution (or the overall number of homes or households that would need to change tenures without changing location) (Dorling and Rees 2003). Thus it is of value in considering the total potential ‘task’ of mixed communities policies, if the goal is to move towards a more even mix of two population groups between sub-areas, rather than avoiding certain more extreme mixes. It is the most widely index of segregation, and is sometimes called ‘the’ index of segregation. Docherty et al. made a rare application of the index to tenure mix and found an association between dissimilarity in the distribution of social renting between Enumeration Districts in a ward and outcomes across the neighbourhood (not for individuals), one overall level of social housing in the wards ad been taken into account, but the associations mostly disappeared once housing quality and population characteristics had been taken into account (??). The index of dissimilarity for ys is:
Half of the sum of the calculation of the following formula for every smaller area which makes up the larger area:
(zs1/ZL) –( ys1/YL) 
(ignoring negative signs, or removing them through squaring and square rooting). Described in words, where we are considering, for example, the dissimilarity of the distribution of council renters and households in other tenures at neighbourhood level in England, this formula refers to half the sum of the calculation for every neighbourhood in England of the following: non-council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of non-council renters nationwide minus council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of council renters nationwide. The index of dissimilarity is a number between 0 and 1.The value of this index is independent of the relative size of the two groups y and z (unlike the index of exposure or interaction). This means it is a good index for measuring change over time, even where the relative size of groups y and z has changed over time, as the various housing tenures have done (see Table ??). It is the same for y and z.
Results: In contrast to the index of isolation, for larger neighbourhoods, the major tenure group with the greatest dissimilarity from other tenures was social renting, with an index of 38.9, compared to home ownership at 32.1 and private renting at 26.8. For smaller neighbourhoods, the relative pattern between the tenures was similar but the level of dissimilarity were substantially higher, with with an index of 49.3 for social renting, 42.1 for private renting and 40.2 for home ownership. (Fig 4). In effect, this index describes the remaining task for mixed tenure policy if it seeks to replicate the national tenure mix within every neighbourhood. This means that 38.9% of social rented homes or all other homes would need to be demolished and replaced elsewhere or transferred between tenures by carefully-targeted Right to Buy and development and purchase policy in order to achieve the same spread between neighbourhoods for social renting households and all in all other tenures combined. The dissimilarity between social renters and home owners specifically was slightly greater, at 40.3. Looking at tenure sub-groups, there was greater dissimilarity between other forms of home ownership and shared ownership than between home ownership and private renting. There was slightly greater dissimilarity between social renting and home ownership than between social renting and private renting. There was substantial dissimilarity between housing association renting and local authority renting, which could be attributed partly to stock transfer as where this occurs, by definition the two sub-tenures cannot co-exist within affected neighbourhoods.


10. The index of exposure. This index measures the degree to which people in any one group are exposed to contact with people in any other group, through living in the same neighbourhood. 

It will be of particular interest for theories about mixed tenure that rely on observation or interaction between people in different tenures. Other measures of mixed do not translate so readily into the potential implications for how residential communities are experienced.
The exposure index for ys to zs is:
The sum of the calculation of the following formula for every smaller area which makes up the larger area:
(ys1/YL) x (zs1/ts1).
Described in words, where we are comparing for example the exposure of council renters to non-council renters at neighbourhood level in England, this formula refers the sum of the calculations for every neighbourhood in England of the following: council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of council renters nationwide multiplied by non-council renters in the neighbourhood as a proportion of all households in the neighbourhood. The exposure index is a number between 0 and 1. Assuming all of the small areas have equal population size (which is not always the case in practical applications), the maximum exposure index for ys to zs is whatever percentage all in group z make up of the national population (ZL/(YL+ZL). The exposure index of ys compared to zs will be different from that for zs compared to ys. Minority groups tend to have higher exposure indices than majority groups. The value of this index is not independent of the relative size of the two groups y and z. This needs to be born in mind when using the exposure index to measure changes in segregation over time or differences between different local authorities or regions, if the relative size of groups y and z has changed over time or varies between places, as is the case with different housing tenures. 








	Exposure	% max. exposure	Exposure	% max. exposure	Exposure	% max. exposure	
10. Exposure of main tenure groups to all other groups
Private renters’ exposure to all others	80.9	 91% (max. 89%)	82.9	94% (max. 87.9)	NA	NA	2.0
Social renters’ exposure to all others (non-market tenures’ exposure to private tenures1)	52.6	76% (Max. 68.8)	68.8 	85% (max 80.7)	61.8	76% (max 80.7)	16.2
Owner occupiers’ exposure to all others	34.3	55% (Max. 62.2)	26.8 	84% (max. 31.8)	24.9	78% (max. 31.8)	-7.5
Exposure of tenure sub-groups to all other groups
Housing association renters’ exposure to all others	92.4	94% (max. 97.9)	87.4	93% (max. 93.9)	81.7	87% (max. 93.9)	-5.0
Council renters’ exposure to all others	54.1	 76% (max. 70.9)	73.6	85% (max. 86.8)	66.0	76% (max. 86.8)	19.5
Outright owners exposure to all others	NA	NA	67.1	95% (max. 70.8)	65.2	93% (max. 70.8)	NA
Owner occupiers buying with a mortgage exposure to all others	NA	NA	58.4	96% (max. 61.1)	56.6	93% (max. 61.1)	NA
Shared owners’ exposure to all others	NA	NA	98.64	99.3% 4 (max. 99.3)	97.6	98%4 (max. 99.3)	NA
11. ‘Role model exposure’: social renters’ exposure to owner occupiers 
	56.2	97% (Max. 57.8)	56.9 	83% (max. 68.2)	49.8	73% (max. 68.2)	0.7
Other exposure of tenure gorups to specific other groups
Shared owners’2 exposure to owner occupiers 	NA	NA	64.9	95% (max. 68.2)	38.5	56% (max. 68.2)	NA
Private renters’ exposure to owner occupiers	44.1	76% (Max. 57.8)	63.6	93% (max. 68.2)	51.3	75% (max. 68.2)	19.5
Renters’ exposure to owner occupiers	53.0	92% (Max. 57.8)	59.6 	87% (max 68.2)	54.8	80% (max 68.2)	6.6
Owner occupiers’3 exposure to renters3	34.9	83% (Max. 42.2)	26.9	86% (max. 31.3)	24.9	80% (max. 31.3)	-8.0
Shared owners’2 exposure to social renters	NA	NA	22.54 	116%4 (max. 19.3)	23.2	120%4 (max. 19.3)	NA
Private renters’ exposure to social renters	25.1	80% (Max. 31.2)	19.34 	100% (max. 19.3)	29.3??	% (max. 19.3)	-5.8
All others’ exposure (private tenures1) to social renters	23.9	77% (Max. 31.2)	16.5	85% (max. 19.3)	16.2	84% (max. 19.3)	-7.4
Owner occupiers’3 exposure to social renters	23.7	76% (Max. 31.2)	16.0 	83% (max. 19.3)	14.1	73% (max. 19.3)	-7.7
Shared owners’2 exposure to private renters	NA	NA	12.74	105%4 (max. 12.04)	12.1	100%4 (max. 12.04)	NA
Social renters’ exposure to private renters	8.8	80% (Max. 11.0)	11.8	98% (max. 12.0)	11.7	98% (max. 12.0)	-5.0
Owner occupiers’3 exposure to private renters	10.6	96% (Max. 11.0)	10.9	91% (max. 12.0)	10.8	90% (max. 12.0)	2.0
Note 1: This includes the 0.7% of households in shared ownership and the 3.2% of households living ‘rent free’; arguably both could or should be excluded from the category; 2: This excludes other forms of low-cost home ownership which the census doesn’t report; 3: This includes shared ownership but excludes other forms of low-cost home ownership; 4: The ‘maximum’ figure assumes that all neighbourhoods are the same size but as Table 2 shows the size of MSOAs varies somewhat, and so in practice exposure rates can reach or exceed the maximum.


11. ‘Role model’ exposure of social renters to owner occupiers. 

Many theories of mixed tenure assume that a greater mix of tenures will allow social renter to be exposed to the behaviour, attitudes or social capital of owner occupiers, by observation and interaction, and that this exposure will then affect their own behaviour and attitudes and social capital to their advantaged (??). Thus from the point of view of mixed tenure theory and policy, the index of exposure of social renters to owner occupiers is particularly important. 

Results: This ‘role model’ exposure was 56.9 in larger neighbourhoods and 49.8 in smaller neighbourhoods. (Table 5) This means that on average 56.9% of the households social renters were exposed to in their neighbourhoods were owners, and that they will have the dominant effect on social renters over any other groups in social renters’ neighbourhoods. This represents 86% of the potential maximum, given the overall national tenure mix in 2001. Thus there is a potential remaining task for mixed tenure policy. The exposure of social renters to owner occupiers is, perhaps surprisingly, higher than the exposure of private renters to owner occupiers. It is significantly higher than the exposure of owner occupiers to social renters. The exposure of owners to social renters is only 16.0, although this is 84% of the maximum.


Summary and implications for the potential task for future mixed tenure policy

In summary, this demonstrates how different definitions of mixed tenure produce very different results. These varied results thus reiterate powerfully the need to specify the definition of mixed tenure being used, whether in research, policy or policy evaluation, and to ensure all readers and policy participations are aware of the definitions being used and their practical implications. Definition 1 suggests either that in 2001 there was no remaining task for mixed tenure policy. In contrast, Definition 2 suggests that the vast majority of neighbourhoods remained in 2001 unmixed and potential targets for mixed tenure policy. 

It also demonstrates how, perhaps surprisingly, using different sized areas as ‘neighbourhoods’, MSOAs and LSOAs does not produced very different results in terms of the number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods there are. This does not necessarily imply that mixed tenure MSOAs contain mixed tenure LSOAs or that mixed tenure LSOAs are contained with in mixed tenure MSOAs. Further work is needed on this question, and to investigate whether the there are also similar numbers of mixed tenure areas, however defined, for the smallest standard neighbourhoods, Output Areas. 


2) How has the number of mixed tenure larger neighbourhoods and the spread of different tenure groups changed 1981-2001? 

As discussed, the number of neighbourhood units reduced 1981-2001, their average size increased, and the variation in their size reduced (Fig 2). This exposes comparison to the ‘modifiable areal unit problem’ (ref??), but there are some predictable limits to its effects. Reducing variation in the size of neighbourhoods reduces the number of relatively very small and very larges ones. For any given tenure mix and distribution between neighbourhoods, as the number of very small neighbourhoods reduces, the number likely to have ‘extreme’ unusual tenure mixes (such as social rented domination, reduces. However, as the number of very large neighbourhoods reduces, the number likely to have ‘very average’ tenure mixes reduces. It is hard to say what the overall effect might be.





Total no ‘neighbourhoods’ 	7,807	6,782	32,482
Mean no households	2,098s	3,015	630
Median no households	1,704	2,966	623
Std deviation in household numbers	1,545	590	102




Standard deviation as percentage of median	91.0%	18.3%	12.7%
Total households 	16,382,646	20,451,431	20,451,431
Total population 	44,200,971	48,248,096	48,248,139
Note 1: Excludes 1048 neighbourhoods with fewer than 500 occupied households; these contained 1.6% of total population; excludes 795 neighbourhoods with fewer than 500 occupied households; these contained 1.2% of the total population

For any given tenure mix and distribution between neighbourhoods, as the number of neighbourhoods reduces, indices of isolation and dissimilarity should reduce and in the index of exposure should increase. Thus they should be affected by the reduction in numbers of neighbourhoods due to the change in units 1981-2001. Due to the change, indices of segregation for 2001 will underestimate ‘real’ segregation in 2001 compared to 1981. If segregation appears to have increased 1981-2001 we can be confident this is not due to the change in units used. If segregation appears to have decreased, part of this change is likely to be artefactual and due to the change in number, size, and variation in size of neighbourhood units, although there may be additional ‘real’ effects.






The results are reported in detail in Figs. 3, 4 and 5. They are reported here in terms of numbers of neighbourhoods, and where the results varies significantly for numbers of households, this is reported as well. 

1. Bare minimum: No change. In 2001, every single English MSOAs was literally mixed. This was also true for wards in 1981. In 1981 every ward had at least one household from each of main two tenures. Thus there were no literal ‘monotenure’ wards, even before the Right to Buy had been introduced, although there were monotenure housing estates and may have been monotenure in smaller areas than wards, such as EDs. In 1981 15 wards had no social housing, but all of these had both some home owners and some private renters. No wards had no home owners or no private renters . Nightingale ward in Hackney, inner London, had just one home owner, as well as social renters and private renters. Whittlesley Kingsmoor in 13 had just one private renting household, as well as social renters and home owners. Thus there was no change in the number of mixed tenure neighbourhoods 1981-2001 on this definition.

2. No one tenure dominant: Reduction in mix. In 1981 10.2% of wards were not dominated by any one tenure, and in 2001 9.0% of MSOAs were not dominated by any one tenure. Thus there was a very slight decline in the number of mixed tenure areas. In the majority of ‘unmixed’ cases, the dominant tenure was owner occupation. This became increasingly true 1981-2001. The number and proportions of areas dominated by owner occupier grew from 73.7% of all neighbourhoods to 85.5%. 

3. Social housing not dominant: Increase in mix. The number and proportion of larger neighbourhoods dominated by social renting fell sharply from 15.2% in 1981 to 5.1% in 2001. Some who use the term ‘mt’ are concerned about areas dominated by social housing, and in these terms the amount of mixed tenure increased 1981-2001. ??Similarly, Docherty et al. also recorded the decline in numbers and percentages of wards dominated by social housing across 1991-2001 (??). The portion dominated by private renting fell from 0.8% to 0.5%. 

4. Hiscock’s definition - Avoiding domination by social housing and heavy domination by owner occupation: Reduction in mix. In 1981 48.2% of wards were mixed by this definition, while by 2001 for MSOAs the figure was 37.6%. As for definition 2, this was due to the substantial rise in the number of heavily owner occupation dominated neighbourhoods, which outweighed the fall in the number of social housing dominated neighbourhoods seen for definition 3. 

5. Avoiding extremes. Increase in mix. In 1981, 54.3% of wards had no one main tenure group more than one standard deviation from the median ward level, and by 2001 58.4% of MSOAs met this definition. 

6. Limited social housing: Increase in mix. In 1981 45.3% of neighbourhoods had fewer than 20% of social housing. In 2001, 72.6% of MSOAs fitted this definition. Thus there was a substantial increase in mix by this measure. Docherty et al. also recorded a decline in numbers and percentages of wards with up to 20% social housing across Britain 1991-2001 (??). 

7. Some, limited affordable housing: Reduction in mix. In 1981 20.4% of wards had 20-30% social housing, in 2001, 15.5% of MSOAs were ‘mixed’ according to this definition. S106 policy did not start to operate until after 1990, but Docherty et al. also recorded the decline in numbers and percentages of wards with 20-29% social housing across Britain 1991-2001 (Docherty et al??). Thus the development of new mixed tenure neighbourhoods with 20-30% social housing created through s106 policies must have been outweighed by other trends against this type of neighbourhood.
 
8. Isolation of main tenure groups: Varied results. Between 1981 and 2001 the isolation of owner occupiers, the largest group in the population, increased from 65.7 to 73.1. The isolation of social renters decreased from 47.2 to 31.2, and there was little change for those in the private rented sector. 

9. Dissimilarity of main tenure groups. On balance, increase in mix. The index of dissimilarity is not affected by the relative size of the tenure groups 1981-2001, but it may be affected by unit size, number and boundary changes, see below). The index of dissimilarity from all other tenures fell for social renters and owner occupiers, fell for all other combinations assessed, and rose just for private renters compared to all other groups. Thus, with the exception of private renting, the proportion of these groups who would need to move across boundaries or change tenure to create an even spread, one way of defining the remaining total task of mixed communities policy, reduced. However, where segregation appears to have decreased, part of this change is likely to be artefactual and due to the change in number, size, and variation in size of neighbourhood units, although there may be additional ‘real’ effects.

10. Exposure of main tenure groups: Varied results. The index of exposure of social renters and private renters compared to all other tenures increased, and in both cases the exposure was closer to the maximum. This is evidence of more tenure mix. However, the index of exposure for owner occupiers reduced from 34.3 to 26.8., which could be described as less mix. If segregation appears to have increased 1981-2001, as in this case, we can be confident this is not due to the change in units used. The index of exposure was actually closer to the maximum exposure in 2001 than in 1981, which meant that the potential task for mixed tenure policy, given the overall existing tenure mix, was reduced.






In summary, this demonstrates again how different definitions of mixed tenure produce very different results, and have different implications for policy evaluation and development. Between 1981 and 2001, according to some definitions of tenure mix at neighbourhood level in England increased:
	The proportion of neighbourhoods in which social housing was not dominant increased;
	The proportion of neighbourhoods in which social renters made up fewer than 20% of all households increased;
	The porprtion of neighbourhoods in which social housing made up 20-30% of households increased;
	The proportion of neighbourhoods in which all major tenures were within one standard deviation of the national neighbourhood median increased (and the standard deviations reduced too??); 
	The isolation of social renters reduced, and their exposure to all other groups increased, and their ‘role model’ exposure to owner occupiers specifically, increased, if marginally;
	The dissimilarity of the location of private renters reduced and their exposure to all other tenures increased;
However according to other definitions, tenure mix decreased:
	The proportion of all neighbourhoods not dominated by any one major tenure fell;
	The proportion of neighbourhoods neither heavily dominated by owner occupation or dominated by social renting fell;
	The dissimilarity of the location of social renters increased;
	The dissimilarity of the location of owner occupiers and their exposure to all other tenures described;
	The isolation of private renters increased.


What are the implications for past tenure mix policy?

The change in tenure mix 1981-2001 described above must be due one or more of the following:
	Changes in the number, size and variation in size of neighbourhood units used (artefactual change, as discussed above);
	Change in the overall national tenure mix;
	Change in how the overall tenure mix is distributed though neighbourhoods. 
Mixed tenure policies may have made a contribution to this, alongside the action of markets and other policy on housing development, conversion, demolition and tenure transfer. Additional housing development per se would not affect these definitions, which all rely on percentage thresholds not absolute number thresholds. The next sections explore the components of change.

Between 1981 and 2001, the total number of households in England grew by 22.8% (Table 1). If i) this household numbers had grown at the same rate in each tenure, so that the overall tenure system would not have changed, and ii) new homes had been distributed proportionately between neighbourhoods, then there would have been no change in any of the nine measures of tenure mix. In fact there were very different rates and locations of growth in household numbers by tenure. Bewteen 1981 and 2001 there was substantial change in the relative size of housing tenure groups in England. The number of households in home ownership grew by 45.9%, the number of private renters grew by 32.4%, while the number of social renters fell by 23.7%. The national tenure mix shifted from 57.8% home ownership, 31.0% social renting and 11.2% private renting to 68.2%, 19.3% and 12.0% respectively (Figure 1). Mixed tenure policy, particularly the Right to Buy may have played a role in this groups tenure size change. 
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